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PROBLEMS IN THE PREVENTION Or "RUI-RUNNING"
Proceedings in the federal courts having to do with the pre-
vention of the smuggling of liquor into the United States are
divisible into two main classes: criminal actions having as their
aim the punishment of the smugglers, and libels for forfeiture of
[979]
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liquor-ships and their cargoes.' In both forms of action two diffi-
cult problems are submitted to the courts: first, whether there is
jurisdiction over the subject matter; and second, whether the
evidence shows a crime against the United States. 2 In solving
these problems the results reached have been widely divergent
and a great variety of opinion as to the grounds upon which the
decisions should be placed has been displayed. If those of the
opinions be' sound which the writer believes so to be, then there
is need of immediate Congressional legislation. But whatever
be the sound opinions there is need of an authoritative Supreme
Court decision to settle a number of doubtful points and to in-
form the enforcement officials what acts are prerequisite to secur-
ing a conviction or a forfeiture.
A number of statutes are in existence under which (supple-
mented when necessary by claims of "inherent" powers) indict-
ments and libels are at present framed.3 There is first the Na-
tional Prohibition Act.4 But since this has been held not to
authorize proceedings in rem against the vessel and cargo until
the conviction of the personal defendant has been secured, it has
been found less convenient 6 for the framing of libels than certain
sections of the Tariff Act of 19221 forbidding the unloading or
transshipment of merchandise without report or entry within
four leagues 8 of the shore of the United States and providing fines
and forfeitures for violations., These provisions have been
' The difference is brought out in NoTEs (1923) 36 HARv. L. Ray. 609,
at 611.
2 This classification is pointed out by Dickinson, EDITORAL COMMENT,
Rum Ship Seizures under the Recent Treaties (1926) 20 Am. Jou. INT. L.
111, 112.
3 See collection by Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 2, at 112, note 3.
4. S. Comp. Sts. Ann. Supp. 1923, secs. 101381A-10138 L. Transpor-
tation and importation of liquor for beverage purposes are prohibited. See.
10138% aa. It is declared the duty of any officer of the law discovering
any person transporting liquor unlawfully in any water craft, etc., to
seize the vehicle and liquor and arrest the person; and of the court, on
conviction of the person arrested, to order. the liquor destroyed and the ve-
hicle sold unless good cause to the contrary is shown. Sec. 10138/2 mm.
5 Construction of sec. 101382 mm, supra note 4. United States v.
Slusser (1921, S. D. Ohio) 270 Fed. 818; United States v. One Cadillac
Touring Car (1921, E. D. Mich.) 274 Fed. 470; Reo Atlanta Co. v. Stern
(1922, N. D. Ga.) 279 Fed. 422; United States v. One Packard Motor
Truck (1922, E. D. Mich.) 284 Fed. 394.
G Desmond, Forfeiture of Vessels in Enforcement of National Prohibition
(1925) 11 A. B. A. JouR. 21.
7 U. S. Comp. Sts. Ann. Supp. 1923, secs. 5841a-5841i-6.
8 In this article "league" refers to the marine league and "mile" to the
nautical mile. These are the units commonly referred to merely as
"leagues" and "miles" in the statutes, texts, and decisions. 1 marine
mile=3 -marine league= 6080 feet=--o degree of latitude.
9 U. S. Comp. Sts. Ann. Supp. 1923, secs. 5841h-4-5841h-6. These
sections supercede U. S. Comp. Sts. 1916, secs. 5555 and 5556 (better known
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found of use in both types of proceeding 0 in view of the Supreme
Court decision that contraband is merchandise within the mean-
ing of the tariff act.11 Another section of this same act authoriz-
ing searches, seizures, and arrests within four leagues of the coast
of the United States for breach of any of its laws12 is invoked to
justify seizures outside the three-mile limit of American terri-
torial waters," while attempts are made to sustain seizures and
as the "Hovering Acts of 1799") providing fines and forfeitures for un-
lawful unlading and transshipping of merchandise within four leagues of
the coast from vessels bound for the United States. Other scetions re-
pealed are U. S. Comp. Sts. 1916, secs. 5508 and 5511, requiring production
on demand within four leagues of shore of accurate manifests and pro-
riding fines for violation. The corresponding section of the 1922 Act
(U. S. Comp. Sts. Ann. Supp. 1923, see. 5341h-3), probably through over-
sight, makes no reference to the four-league zone. Prior to the act of 1922
libels and indictments against "rum-runners" were customarily framed un-
der the repealed sections above cited. See NoTEs (1923) 36 HLRv. L. REV.
609, 610, note 6.
10 Supra, note 1.
13 United States v. Sischo (1923) 262 U. S. 165, 43 Sup. Ct. 511. The
case involved opium smuggling but is equally applicable to the liquor trade.
12U. S. Comp. Sts. Ann. Supp. 1923, sec. 5841h. This section also au-
thorizes the demanding of manifests within four leagues of shore.
13 To say that the limit of the territorial jurisdiction of the United States
is three miles from shore obviously does not mean that the government
has the same power over persons and ships within three miles of shore as
it does over persons and vehicles on land. See Brown, EDITOnIAL COM-
M ENT, The illarginal Sea, (1923) 17 Am. Joun. INT. L. 89. Certain limita-
tions on that power are established in international law; c. g., the "rights"
of innocent passage and of refuge under which foreign ships may bring
liquor within the three-mile zone with immunity from seizure. The latter
was recognized in United States v,. 2130 Cases of Champagne (1926,
C. C. A. 2d) 9 Fed. (2d) 710; while in Latham v. United Statcs (1924,
C. C. A. 4th) 2 Fed. (2d) 208, 210, the former was alluded to but held in-
applicable where a "rum-runner" skirting the three-mile limit had inad-
vertently passed over, apparently on the ground that she was not in
passage between foreign ports. It is likewise admitted in international
law that a government may have some powers beyond the three-mile limit;
e. g., that of "fresh pursuit." The Ship North v. the King (190G) 07
Can. Sup. Ct. 385. The existence of a three-mile limit in international
law has been vigorously denied. The history of the question is reviewed
at length in NoTEs (1923) 23 COL. L. REV. 472, where the conclusion is
reached that there is no such thing as a three-mile limit. It is undeniable
that such a limit is not recognized by all or even a majority of civilized
nations and that certain rights of seizure beyond that limit have been de-
clared by the statutes and enforced by the courts of the United States
from the end of the eighteenth centuary. See note 9, cupra. The State
Department, however, has been a constant upholder of the three-mile limit.
See, for example, the correspondence between Mr. Seward, U. S. See. State,
and Mr. Tassara, Spanish Minister, in 1862, concerning the marginal sea
of Cuba: 1 Moore, Int. L. Dig. (1906) 706; Fulton, The Sovereignty of
the Sea (1911) 665. The United States at one time claimed a wider terri-
torial jurisdiction in Behring Sea and forfeited for breach of municipal
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arrests even outside the twelve-mile limit of the act on a theory
of "inherent" power in the United States to enforce its criminal
laws. 14  Under two sections of the Criminal Code, one making
persons aiding and abetting a crime responsible as principals" and
another providing punishment for a conspirator if an overt act
has been committed by his co-conspirator,16 indictments have been
framed against persons and libels against ships which never came
within the twelve-mile limit until forcibly brought there, on the
theory that they were constructively present by means of their
colleagues who did the physical act of importing liquor into the
United States.
In the early days of prohibition, seizures committed more than
three and less than twelve miles from shore and forfeitures de-
creed thereunder 17 led to protest by the British government and
orders by our government to release vessels seized between three
and twelve miles from shore and to confine future seizures to the
three-mile limit.'18 The result to enforcement was so unsatisfac-
tory that retaliation was undertaken in the threat of an order
to seize liquor brought into United States ports on foreign vessels
even though they were sea-stores kept under seal during the en-
tire period of the vessels' remaining in port.-0 Such an order
was practically sustained in advance by the Supreme Court of the
law certain foreign vessels sealing beyond the three-mile limit. The
James G. Swan (1892, D. Wash.) 50 Fed. 108; The Kodiak (1892, D.
Alaska) 53 Fed. 126; In re Cooper (1892) 143 U. S. 472, 12 Sup. Ct. 453;
The Alexander (1894, D. Alaska) 60 Fed. 914. But on protest of the
foreign nations the matter was submitted to an international court of
arbitration whose award recognized the three-mile limit. Knott, The
Behring Sea Arbitration (1893) 27 Ai. L. Rav. 684. To this the United
States submitted. Fulton, op. cit. supra, at 695; Fenwick, Int. Law
(1924) 295. Thereafter forfeiture of sealing vessels seized beyond the
three-mile limit was denied. 'The La Ninfa (1896, C. C. A. 9th) 75 Fed.
513; The Alexander (1896, C. C. A. 9th) 75 Fed. 519. The conclusion to
be drawn seems to be that in 1923 a three-mile limit existed in the con-
templation of international law at least as between the United States,
Great Britain, and certain other nations. The meaning of the term is,
however, vague.
14 For this purpose reliance is placed on a strong obiter dictum of Chief
Justice Marshall in Church v. Hubbart (1804, U. S.) 2 Cranch, 187, 234.
15 Sec. 332 (U. S. Comp. Sts. 1916, sec. 10506).
16 Sec. 37 (U. S. Comp. Sts. 1916, sec. 10201).
17 United States v. Bengochea (1922, C. C. A. 5th) 279 F ed. 537; The
Grace and Ruby (1922, D. Mass.) 283 Fed. 475; United States v. 1250
Cases of Liquor (1922, S. D. N. Y.) 286 Fed. 260, aff'd (1923, C. C. A. 2d)
292 Fed. 486, certorari denied (1923) 263 U. S. 712, 44 Sup. Ct. 38.
18 See COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 259, note 3; NorTs
(1924) 23 MIcH. L. Rav. 163, 164.
19 See Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon (1923) 262 U. S. 100, 120, 43 Sup.
Ct. 504, 506.
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United States ;21 and soon afterwards Great Britain was induced
to enter into a treaty"1 with the United States whereby, in con-
sideration of a provision allowing her freedom from forfeiture of
liquor entering United States ports in British vessels as sea-stores
under seal,'22 she agreed to raise no objections to seizures within
a one-hour steaming distance of our shore for violation of the
laws of the United States, the one-hour zone to be measured by
the speed of the vessel seized or of a connecting vessel if the in-
tent should be to land liquor by such vessel.23 In this treaty the
three-mile limit of territorial waters of the contracting parties
was expressly preserved. -"  Similar treaties have been entered
into by a number of other nations with the United States. Some
of these affirm the three-mile limit2 while others merely reserve
previous claims of territorial jurisdiction without stating their
extent. "-'O Indictments and libels for arrests and seizures beyond
the twelve-mile limit have been framed under these treaties in an
attempt to construe them as extending 7 the criminal law of the
United States and the jurisdiction of its courts to a new one-hour
limit.-8
20 Cunard Steamship Co. v. MeUou, supra note 19. The international ef-
fect of this decision is discussed in Co M t Ts (1923) 33 YALE LAW Jour-
NAL, '72.
21 (1924) 43 Stat. at L. 1761. For an interesting discuosion of the treaty
-written prior to its construction by the courts, see Scott, EnIor. C0M-
_mNT, The Liquor Treaty betwecn the United States anid Great Britaiz




25 Germany (1924) 43 Stat. at L. 1815; Panama (1924) 43 Stat. at L.
1875; Netherlands (1924) published in (1925) 19 Am. Jots. IrT. L. 115,
Supp.
2 0Norway (1924) 43 Stat. at L. 1772; Denmark (1924) 43 Stat. at L.
1309; Sweden (1924) 43 Stat. at L. 1330; Italy (1921) 43 Sta. at L. 1844.
Similar treaties (not yet ratified) have been signed with France (1924),
Belgium (1925), and Spain (1926). See Dickinson, EDITOrJIL COMsv Er,
Treaties for the Prevention of Sm uggling (192G) 20 Ar. Joun. INT. L. 340,
341, 342. The variance in the language of these treaties is doubtlezs due
to the fact that these nations have in the past claimed a territorial juris-
diction in excess of three miles. cf. supra note 13.
27 For all practical purposes the treaty marks an extension and so it was
regarded by its framers. Under modern conditions it is not probable
that a case will ever arise where the boat in question is so slow that the
one-hour limit will fall within the twelve-mile limit. Questions relating
to a seizure within the twelve-mile and without the one-hour limit are
therefore academic.
28 The Marjorie E. Bachman (1925, D. Blass.) 4 Fed. (2d) 405; The
Over the Top (1925, D. Conn.) 5 Fed. (2d) 838; United Statea v. Henning
(1925, S. D. Ala.) 7 Fed. (2d) 488; Ford v. Unzited States (1920, C. C. A.
9th) 10 Fed. (2d) 339, affirn-ing United States v. Ford (1025, S. D. Calif.)
3 Fed. (2d) 643; United States v. the Sagatind (192G, C. C. A. 2d),
not yet reported, affnizig The Sagatind (1925, S. D. N. Y.) 4 Fed. (2d)
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The jurisdictional question in these cases is really this: will the
court decide the case before it? In other words, has the defend-
ant been brought into court in such a manner that the court will
undertake to determine whether a crime has been committed?
In the purely criminal actions (i. e., those aimed at punishment
of persons) it would seem that there should be little difficulty. 2'
A court is generally deemed to have jurisdiction to try a person
accused of crime by the very fact of his presence in court regard-
less of the methods taken to procure that presence.0 Accordingly
it has been held that the place where the seizure and arrest oc-
curred is not of importance in this connection.". It has been
suggested that the same rule should apply to the libels, on either
of two grounds: that libels are criminal in fact if not in form or
that the ship is deemed held by the arrest of the marshal after
it is brought into port rather than by seizure at sea. 2  While
the latter ground seems an unconvincing fiction the former ap-
pears more worthy of notice 3 However, the courts in many in-
stances have thought they must look further to sustain their juris-
diction. Some have thought it a political matter.3 4  What seems
to be a majority have deemed it necessary that the seizure be
"lawful," 35 but have differed as to the interpretation of that
word. Apparently it means authorized by municipal law, and,
according to the better view, municipal statute law,30 although
928 and United States v. the Sagatind (1925, S. D. N. Y.) 8 Fed. (2d) 789.
In The Pictonian (1924, E. D. N. Y.) 3 Fed. (2d) 145, leave was given to
amend the libel to show the seizure within the one-hour limit.
29 Cf. NoTEs (1923) 36 HtARv. L. REV. 609, 611.
00 Ker v. Illinois (1884) 110 Ill. 627, aff'd (1886) 119 U. S. 436,
7 Sup. Ct. 225; cf. (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 801.
3'Ford v. United States, supra note 28; but see United States v. Hcu-
ning, supra note 28, at 490, where the conviction was put on the ground
that the treaty extends the territorial waters of the United States to the
one-hour limit, the court being apparently of the opinion that such an
extension was necessary to confer jurisdiction to try for crime a person
arrested beyond the twelve-mile limit.
32 NOTES (1923) 36 HARv. L. Ruv. 609, at 611-613, cited with approval
by Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 2, at 112, 115.
3 The point is made that the purpose of forfeiture is punishment, not
compensation, and that the absence of a personal defendant is purely a
formal matter. NOTE S (1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 609, 612, note 23.
34 See The Grace and Ruby, supra note 17, at 478.
35 A clear explanation of this rule occurs in The Underwriter (1925,
D. Conn.) 6 Fed. (2d) 937, at 939, where an American vessel, seized be-
yond the twelve-mile limit, was released on the ground of lack of juris-
diction.
so The Underwriter, supra note 35; accord: United States v. Bentley
(1926, D. Mass.), not yet reported. Although this was a criminal case
which came up on a motion for exclusion of evidence, the point involved is
identical, since the court held it to be settled law that evidence obtained
by an unlawful search and seizure was inadmissible. A similar view
984
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some courts relying on statements in a rather confused series of
early Supreme Court decisions have thought the express author-
ization of Congress unnecessary on the theory that the United
States has an inherent power, exercisable beyond the limits of its
own territory, to secure itself from injuries57  The State De-
partment has not supported this view. Although some courts
have thought it necessary to sustain their jurisdiction on prin-
ciples of international law also,'- this would not seem essential
where there is statutory authorization to seize. The established
rule seems to be that it is the duty of a judge to decide in ac-
cordance with the plain meaning of a statute although that neces-
sitates the breach of an international obligation.-"
Assuming, then, that statutory authority to seize is necessary
and sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts, it would -eem
to be apparent that where the seizure is within twelve miles of
shore such jurisdiction will be conferred, and so the courts have
occurs in Ford v. United States, supra note 23, at 318, where the evidence
was admitted on the ground that it was lawfully obtained.
37 United States v. The Island Home (1924, S. D. Ten.) 6 Fed. (21) 467
(note 1); The Rosalie M. (1925, S. D. Tex.) 4 Fed. (2d) 815; Tbr M17,riel
E. Witers (1925, S. D. Tex.) 6 Fed. (2d) 466; The Hometead (1925,
S. D. N. Y.) 7 Fed. (2d) 413. The principal authority referred to in the-e
cases is the dictum of Chief Justice Marshall in Ckiwch -e. Hznbbaet, c,p
note 14. The dictum seems to be overruled by the opinion of the same
judge in Rose r. Hiucly (1808, U. S.) 4 Cranch, 211, which in turn ap-
pears to the syllabus writer to be overruled by Hur.,,,- v. G (' 1810,
U. S.) 6 Cranch, 281, afflrming (1SO8, U. S.) 4 Cranch, 293. The opiniun3
are enigmatic and have given rise to much divergent discuZion by te:t
writers. See Wright, The Prohibition Aac dcmnt and Iztcr oznl Lan,
(1922) 7 M ixx. L. Ruv. 28, 38; CO MIMENTS (1923) 32 Y,=L L ., JOUEM:AL,
259, 262; Nomzs (1923) 23 CoL L. Rav. 472, 473, note 19; N0ZS A:M Co" x-
MENTs (1924) 23 MicH. L. REV. 163. 164; Potter, Ji:,;.!dVcion, o-'cr AlLtn
Merchant Vessels (1924) 2 Wis. L. Rav. 340, 419; DieldnZon, op. ct. atpra
note 2, at 115. It is submitted that the dictum of Chi'rch v. Hubbaet, t;Ipra,
if it can be accorded any veight to-day in view of the subsequent Supreme
Court decisions, must be confined to the existent conditions (di-eu::cd in
the opinion, at 235) of a distant colonial coast "seldom irequenti'A by
vessels but for the purpose of illicit trade" and that it shou!d have no
application to the present "rum-running" situation.
3s See Dickinson, op. eit. svpra note 2, at 115. In The Frai.cc Ls,.v'ie
(1924, D. Mass.) 1 Fed. (2d) 1004, at 1005, the government attempted to
sustain the jurisdiction over a vessel seized without the one-hour limit on
"general principles of international law." The court, at 1006, in declaring
that the treaty was intended "to deal with the matter in a complete way"
apparently admitted that international law governed.
-
9 Head Money Cases (1884) 112 U. S. 5S0, 5 Sup. Ct. 247; Whi'fcy V.
Robertson (1888) 124 U. S. 190, S Sup. Ct 456; see Wright, C~nfliets of
Inter ational Law with Natfonal Laws and Ordnaacc-m (1917) 11 A:,I.
Joun. INT. L. 1, 7; Hughes, Recent Questions and Negotiatioas (1921) 1
Am. JoUR. INT. L. 229, 230, quoting from Grcat Brita N r. Coata Rica (in-
ternational arbitration case, opinion by Ch. J. Taft); Fenwich, op. cit.
supra. note 13, at 256; Nielsen, Iaternational .pcct" of Recct Pohi itom,
Act Decisions (1925) 13 GEorGarowrN L. Joun. 243, 259; Dickinson, EDIxorIAL
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held. 40 The same would seem to be true even in the highly im-
probable event of the one-hour limit falling within the twelve-
mile limit with the seizure in between. But the effect of a seizure
made more than twelve miles and less than one hour from land
is more difficult of determination. The question is one of inter-
pretation of the one-hour treaties as part of "the supreme law
of the land." 41 Some courts have held them, since they were
intended to cover the whole matter of seizures of "rum-runners,"
to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the United States to the
one-hour limit,42 surely an anomalous result since it would justify
seizures of foreign ships under circumstances where American
ships would be immune. Other courts have declared no such
extension of jurisdiction to be deducible from a reasonable con-
struction of the treaties.4 3 This seems to be the better view.
The treaties seem explicitly to contain only promises by certain
foreign nations not to object to certain seizures. Nowhere in
them is expressly contained an authorization by the United States
to its officers to make such seizures.
In The Panama (1925, S. D. Tex.) 6 Fed. (2d) 326, the court
decreed the forfeiture of a British vessel seized beyond both the
twelve-mile and one-hour limits. If the doubtful conclusion be ad-
mitted that statutory authorization to United States officers to
seize is unnecessary for the courts' jurisdiction, as had been con-
sistently held by this court,4 the decision seems sustainable. The
treaty no more restricted the jurisdiction than extended it. No
promise by the United States not to seize beyond the one-hour
limit is to be found in the British treaty, nor any release of any
claim of power or privilege to seize British vessels for infraction
of our laws at any distance from our coast. Such a promise or re-
lease does not seem to be implied from any of the terms of the
COMMENT, International Political Questions in the National Courts (1925)
19 Am. JOUR. INT. L. 157. It becomes then the duty of the executive to
reconcile foreign governments; if the municipal statute and decisions do
violate international law, the municipal law must give way in the inter-
national forum. Cf. the release of foreign ships seized outside territorial
waters, supra note 18.
40 Supra note 17; Latham v. United States, supra, note 13; United States
v. 2180 Cases of Champagne (1925, E. D. N. Y.) 4 Fed. (2d) 735, (1924,
E. D. N. Y.) 8 Fed. (2d) 763, reversed [on question of crime] (1926, C. C. A.
2d) 9 Fed. (2d) 710; The Muriel E. Winters, supra note 37; in Romano v.
United States (1925, C. C. A. 2d) 9 Fed. (2d) 522, 524, where the indict-
ment was dismissed for insufficient evidence, the jurisdictional point was
apparently assumed.
41 U. S. Const. Art. VI, paragraph [2].
42 The Frances Louise, supra note 38; The Pictonian, supra note 28;
United States v. Henning, supra note 28.
43 United States v. The Sagatind, supra note 28.
4"-United States v. The Island Home, supra note 37; The Rosalie At.,
supra note 37; The Muriel E. Winters, supra note 37.
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treaty-not even from the provision retaining the three-mile limit
of territorial jurisdiction-' in view of the fact that the claim of the
United States to a power and privilege of seizure beyond that
limit had existed for many years-, simultaneously with a refusal
to admit that that vague concept, "territorial jurisdiction," ex-
tends beyond three miles from landAT
When a court has decided to its own satisfaction that it has
jurisdiction of the case there remains the question: has a crime
been committed? To constitute a crime there is necessary an
overt act forbidden by the criminal law of the United States and
committed at a place to which that law extends. There is no
dispute that any such act is a crime if committed within the three-
mile limit,s the National Prohibition Act having been expressly
held by the Supreme Court to extend that far,9 nor that the
specific acts of unlading and transshipping without making report
or entry are crimes if committed within twelve miles of shore
under the Tariff Act of 1922." Furthermore, it seems to be the
majority rule that if an overt act is committed under any of the
above circumstances so as to constitute a crime, a person remain-
ing outside the three- or even the twelve-mnile limit and there
doing another act which with the first forms part of a general
scheme to commit a crime against the United States is guilty of
a crime either as a conspirator or as a principal;"' but there is
contrary authority.:2 The treaties have been held by some courts
to extend the criminal law of the United States to the one-hour
limit,53 although others have been able to find no such implication
in their terms., The problem is similar to that previously dis-
cussed in respect to jurisdiction."
-' Supra notes 13, 24.
-6 In the "Hovering Acts of 1799," supra note 9.
47 See the controversy concerning Cuba, svpra note 13.
1- United States z. 2180 Cases of Champagne, sippra note 13.
49 Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, supra note 19.
50 The Muriel E. Winters, supra note 37. The ship was seized between
three and twelve miles from shore where she had b~en transshipping liquor.
Held, only the liquor there transshipped and the ship, not the balance of
the liquor still on board, were subject to forfeiture.
51 Latham v. United States, supra note 13; Ford v. United Statc, suprc
note 28; see United States v. Bentley, supra note 36. In The Pict,07dz,
supra note 28, where the ship seized was only waiting outside the twelve-
mile limit for connecting vessels, it was held that a forfeiture could be
decreed on proper amendment to the libel since the treaty (held to com-
pletely govern the matter) authorized seizure for an attempt to commit a
crime against the United States.
52 The Muriel E. Winters, supra note 37; see The Marjorie E. Bachman,
supra note 28, at 408.
M The Pictonian, supra note 28; United States v. Henning, upra note 23.
51 The Over the Top, supra note 28; The Panama, text, supra, at 936;
Romano v. United States, supra note 40.
r Tet , supra, at 986.
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No very difficult problem has arisen as to what the criminal
overt act must be. Unlading or transshipping,60 and failing to
exhibit manifest on demand" within the twelve-mile limit are
of course sufficient, as is also the bringing of liquor within a col-
lection district with intent to defraud the United States of
customs.58 One seizure of an American vessel was sustained,
when no other crime could be proved, on the ground of engaging
in a business other than that for which licensed, that business
being the transportation of liquor outside the three-mile limit."
A sale of liquor on the high seas with knowledge that it is to be
unlawfully imported into the United States is a crime under the
better view on the theory of conspiracy or of aiding and abetting,
if the liquor is actually brought by the purchaser within the three-
mile limit ;60 but there is authority contra.5' A gift under similar
circumstances although for the purpose of inducing the donee
to buy is not a crime.- Where the sale is made to revenue of-
ficers outside the twelve-mile limit the courts have properly re-
fused to find a crime since such a sale can be a crime only by virtue
of knowledge of the buyer's unlawful intent to import and there
was no unlawful importation or intent to import by the buyers5
It is remarkable how few of the "rum-running" cases have been
taken to the Supreme Court. We have so far by that tribunal
only three decisions on the subject, informing us respectively that
the National Prohibition Act makes it a crime to bring any liquor
within the three-mile limit ;"- that contraband is merchandise un-
der the tariff act, and jurisdiction is acquired over a foreign
vessel seized between three and twelve miles from shore; ' and
that a crime was committed in transshipping liquor within the
56 The Grace and Ruby, supra note 17 (the decision was put on the
ground that the vessel assisted in the landing with its small boat and men) ;
United States v. 1250 Cases of Liquor, supra note 17 (this case and the
preceding arose prior to the tariff Act of 1922, supra note 7); Latham v.
United States, supra note 13.
57 United States v. Bengochea, supra note 17.
58 United States v. 2180 Cases of Champagne, supra note 13.
49 The Rosalie M., supra note 37.
60 Latham v. United States, supra note 13; The Panama, text, supra at
986; Ford v. United States, supra note 28.
61 The Muriel E. Winters, supra note 37; Romano v. United 'States, supra
note 40; see the Marjorie E. Bachman, supra note 28, at 408.
62 United States v. 2180 Cases of Champagne, supra note 13.
63 The Marjorie E. Bachman, supra note 28; The Over the Top, supra
note 28; United $tates v. the Sagatind, supra note 28. These cases bring
up a further question as to the measure of the one-hour zone. The better
rule seems to be that the vessel must be capable of reaching shore in one
hour under existent conditions of load and weather. The Over tho Top,
supra, note 28. But there is authority that the most favorable conditions
may be taken for a test of speed. Ford v. United States, supra note 28.
64 Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, supra note 19.
O5 United States v. Sischo, supra note 11.
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twelve-mile limit for shippage ashore., The need is ap-
parent of a decision determining the question of jurisdiction
when the seizure is made beyond the twelve-mile limit and also
of the commission of a crime where the act was beyond that limit.
It is submitted that such a decision will show that Congressional
legislation is necessary to extend our criminal law and the juris-
liction of our courts to the one-hour limit. Apparently legisla-
tion similar to the "twelve-mile" sections of the Tariff Act of
192267 would be sufficient. It might also be advisable to expressly
enact that there is no jurisdiction where the seizure was beyond
the one-hour limit and no crime where no act was committed
within it, in order to forestall any more decisions, such as The
Panamam, likely to involve our government in international
complications.
THE CHRYSLER PLAN OF FIRE AND THEFT INSURANCE
A great part of the total number of automobiles purchased by
the American public is sold under plans whereby the purchasers
at retail pay only part of the purchase price when they take de-
livery of the car, and are given credit for the balance, made pay-
able in installments. It is the common practice of dealers selling
cars on time to assure themselves of the services of some banking
or finance company, which agrees to purchase or discount the
purchase money notes. In order to protect themselves, these
companies require insurance against the perils of fire and theft
on the cars involved. The Chrysler plan of fire and theft insur-
ance is an attempt to reduce the charges for such financing, and
to procure uniform insurance protection on all Chrysler cars, by
having all financing of the time payment purchases done by the
Chrysler Corporation itself. This is effected by an open policy
of insurance taken in the Palmetto Insurance Company of South
Carolina which purports to insure the Chrysler Corporation of
1Michigan "and/or whom it may concern" against fire and theft
of all cars manufactured during a given period, the insurance to
be for the term of one year after the car is sold to the retal pur-
chaser. The policy is executed in Detroit, Michigan, with the
resident agent of the Palmetto Company, and states that it is to
be performed in that state. The original policy is kept by the
Chrysler Corporation in Detroit. When a car is sold to a retail
purchaser, the dealer notifies the Chrysler Corporation of the
sale, and the Chrysler Corporation notifies the agent of the Pal-
metto Company, who sends direct to the purchaser, naming him,
a certificate of insurance, a counterpart of which is sent to others
who have an equity in the car, such as finance companies, and
banking concerns discounting purchase money notes. This cer-
rG United States v. 1250 Cases of Liquor, supra note 17.6 7Supra note 7.
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tificate states that the purchaser agrees that its terms shall
embody all agreements then existing between himself and the
company. The policy provides, however, that the omission to
report the sale of a car, or to issue a certificate in respect thereto,
shall not prevent the retail buyer of a car from being protected
under the policy.
The validity of the Chrysler plan has been challenged in the
federal courts of four states, and the failure of these courts to
agree will undoubtedly lead to further litigation.
In Palmetto Fire Insurance Co. v Conn.,' the Palmetto Com-
pany, licensed to do business in Ohio, sought an injunction re-
straining the superintendent of insurance from revoking its
license, which he had threatened to do on the ground that the
Palmetto Company, in issuing certificates of insurance in
Michigan under its. contract with the Chrysler Corporation, inso-
far as such certificates applied to Chrysler cars sold in Ohio,
violated ihe insurance laws of that state. The court did not deny
that the contract was a Michigan contract, but held that, whether
it was or not, the Palmetto Company had violated the laws of
Ohio which prohibit an insurance company, legally authorized to
transact business in Ohio, from writing, placing, or causing to be
written or placed insurance upon property located in the state,
except through a legally authorized agent in the state.2 The court
said: "Chrysler retail car dealers are not insurance agents, nor
are they qualified nor have they attempted to qualify as such
under the insurance laws of the state," and therefore denied the
injunction.
In Palmetto Insurance Co. v. Beh 3 the superintendent of insur-
ance likewise sought to revoke the license granted to the Pal-
metto Company tol do business in that state, claiming that the
Chrysler plan violated the laws of New York in that it was "for
the purpose of cheating and defrauding the State of New York
and the people thereof out of taxes and revenues on business
transacted in the State of New York." The court granted an
injunction restraining the threatened action of the commissioner.
The court said that the insurance entered into under the plan was
effected in Michigan, not in New York, and that the Palmetto
Company, by insuring in Michigan a Chrysler car owned in New
York by a resident thereof was not doing business in the latter
state, and therefore was not as to such contracts doing business
in New York contrary to its laws.
In Chrysler Sales Corporation v. Smith4 the Palmetto Company
was not licensed to do business in Wisconsin. The Chrysler Cor-
poration of Michigan brought suit to enjoin the insurance com-
1 (1925, D. Ohio) 9 Fed. (2d) 202.
Ohio Gen. Code, 1921, sec. 5438.
3 (1925, S. D. N. Y.) not yet reported.
4 (1925, D. Wis.) 9 Fed. (2d) 666.
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missioner from publicly asserting that the insurance issued by
the Palmetto Company was contrary to the laws of Wisconsin,
and from threatening to prosecute Wisconsin dealers in Chrysler
cars for violating Wisconsin statutes regulating the insurance
business within the state. The court denied the application for
an injunction on the ground that the Michigan contract was not
an insurance in praesenti, but a contract to insure in the future,
and that the contract of insurance was made in Wisconsin.
Therefore, the court held, the Palmetto Company was doing busi-
ness within the state without a license, and Chrysler dealers vere
agents selling insurance in Wisconsin in violation of the laws of
that state requiring such agents to be licensed
In Chrysler Sales Corporation v. Spcnccr- the court, relying
on the Wisconsin case, likewise held that Chrysler dealers were
agents selling insurance in Maine without a license,7 in violation
of the statute.3
There seems to be no doubt of the general proposition that the
Palmetto Company of South Carolina had the power and the
privilege to make a contract of insurance in Michigan with a
citizen of another state upon property situated in that stateY
On the other hand it seems equally clear that a state may punish
a person who procures insurance for a resident of that state from
a South Carolina corporation not admitted to do business in that
state. 10 It is believed that the validity of the Chrysler plan may
be considered by keeping these propositions separate and dis-
tinct.
The Wisconsin and Maine courts denied that the "contract of
insurance" was made in Michigan. The legalistic grounds upon
which this conclusion is predicated are: (1) That the contract
5 "No person, officer, or broker, agent or sub-agent of any insurance corpo-
ration of any kind required to pay any tax or license fee to the state shall
act or aid in any manner in transacting the business of or with such corpo-
ration in placing risks or in collecting any premiums or assessments or
effecting insurance therein, without first procuring from the insurance
commissioner a certificate of authority." Wis. Sts. 1925, sec. 209.04.
6 (1925, D. Me.) 9 Fed. (2d) 674.
7 The Maine court did not consider whether the Palmetto Company was
doing business in the state without a license.
8 "The insurance commissioner may issue a license to any person to act
as an agent . . . If any person solicits, receives, or forwards any
risk or application for insurance to any company, without first receiving
such license, or fraudulently assumes to be an agent and thus procures
risks and receives money for premiums, he shall be punished. . .
Maine Rev. Sts. 1916, ch. 53, sec. 121.
9 A1lgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) 165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427.
LoHooper w. Califonzi (1895) 155 U. S. 648, 15 Sup. Ct. 207. But it
has been held in New York that the legislature has no power to prohibit
a resident of New York from entering into a contract with a corporation
of another state having the privilege of doing business therein. Hammond
v. Internati a In. Co. (1909) 63 Misc. 437, 116 N. Y. Supp. 854, aff'd
134 App. Div. 995, 119 N. Y. Supp. 1127.
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of insurance is a "personal" contract, which does not "attach to
property." (2) That the insurance contemplated under the plan
never has effective existence until the sale at retail, the implica-
tion being that unless there be an existing risk covered there can
be no valid contract of insurance. It is believed that neither of
these grounds is tenable.
The rule that insurance is a personal contract was one probably
evolved for the purpose of protecting the insurer, so that the
policy could not be assigned, and the moral hazard changed, with-
out the consent of the company." While this rule may obtain
where no intention to the contrary is expressed, it would seem
that the parties may frame a contract which shall "attach to
property," and which shall give to future owners of the property
rights under the contract. 12
Where such an intention is expressed, contracts of insurance
which shall attach in the future have often been held valid. Per-
haps the most typical instance is a contract of marine insurance,
insuring goods on a return voyage long before they are bought.
In De Hahn v. Hartley,13 the policy was drawn in London on a
11 Cf. Lyncz v. Dalzell (1729) 4 Bro. P. C. 432. To say that an insur-
ance contract is "personal" means merely that the insured has no power
of assignment, for the reason that the contract is aleatory, and assignment
might increase the "risks."
' Vance, Insurance (1904) 50. See the comment on the Maine case,
supra note 6, in NOTES (1926) 74 U. PA. L. REv. 491. The rule of "per-
sonality" has not prevented many American courts from holding that when
a vendor of realty receives money payable under an insurance policy
previously procured on the buildings sold, which have been damaged by fire
after the execution of the contract but before conveyance to the vendee,
the vendee may maintain a bill to compel the vendor to pay over the in-
surance money, that is, that in such cases "the insurance runs with the
land." See COMMENTS (1924) 34 YALE LAw JoURNAL, 87; of. Lingen-
felter v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (1885) 19 Mo. App. 252. Nor has the rule pre-
vented the courts from holding that where a loss occurs by fire after the
death of the insured, the proceeds of an insurance policy which is expressed
to run to his executors, administrators, or assigns, passes to the heirs at
law, and not to the administrator. Wyman v. Wyman (1863) 26 N. Y.
253; Vance, Cases on Insurance (1914) 594, note; (1921) 16 A. L. R. 313,
note; cf. Oldham's Trustee v. Boston Ins. Co. (1920) 189 Ky. 844, 226
S. W. 106. In Quarles v. Clayton (1899) 87 Tenn. 308, a fire policy upon
a dwelling house provided that the loss should be "payable to the assured,
his executors or administrators," conditional upon there being no change
in title or possession of the property insured "except by succession by rea-
son of death of the assured." The court said that a contract of fire in-
surance is a personal contract, but that the legal effect of this exception in
the policy was to continue and extend the policy in favor of those who by
succession take the property covered by the risk. (The widow of the as-
sured was held not entitled to, the insurance money because, since she
occupied the dwelling house by virtue of her marriage contract with the
assured, she took by "purchase" and not by "succession").
13 (1786, K. B.) 1 Term. Rep. 343; Vance, Cases on. Inmi-anco (1914)
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ship then in Liverpool to cover ship and cargo at and from the
West Coast of Africa to the British West Indies. The validity
of the contract was not even questioned on this account. And
in Rhind v. Wilkiiwoe 14 it was said: "It is an everyday's prac-
tice to insure goods on a return voyage long before they are
bought." In such cases obviously the property is not in existence
at the time the policy is drawn, and the risk attaches in the future,
yet the validity of the contract of insurance as at the time it was
drawn seems never to have been questioned.
Again, policies upon a fluctuating stock of goods, drawn in-
tentionally to cover goods which should be acquired by the insured
from time to time during the continuation of the policy, are con-
sidered valid. 0G Insurance upon the constantly changing contents
of an oil tank is validY.1 And so of a policy issued to a farmer,
covering not only the live stock then owned by him, but that to
be subsequently acquired during the term of the policy.5 And
a policy upon crops to be grown during a period of five years was
held to cover grain that was properly within the description of
the policy, but which had been raised on land not owned by the
insurer at the time of the execution of the policy.'
1- (1810, C. P.) 2 Taunt. 237. See Arnould, Marhc In-mtaace (9th ed.
1914) sec. 258. In Henshav_, . 3ftual Safety Ins. Co. (1243, S. D. N. Y.)
2 Blatehf. 99, the court said: "A policy upon an interest to b2 acquired
after the execution of the contract is valid. This is the ordinary and per-
haps the most serviceable class of insurance. Cargoes can bc purehaced,
and laden from port to port, on trading voyages, under the protection of
policies already in existence, without waiting for the means of obtaining
satisfactory insurance after the interest is acquired"
IS The Wisconsin court attempted to distinguich the marine in' urance
cases on the ground that "in those cases operative insurance did not await
the selection and assent of one of those intended by the phrase 'whom it
may concern,' nor was the term of effective insurance fixed by the trans-
action with him." But this assumes the very point in issue. For it is
here contended that the terms of the insurance were fixed under the Mich-
igan contract, and the marine insurance cases sanction the postponerent
of the risk until property shall come into existence or be purchased by the
insured. As to who may take under the designation "for whom it may
concern" see 6zfra, note 22. The distinction drawn by the M11aine court,
that in the marine cases the insurance was on a specific ship or cargo, and
the thing to which the insurance attached was lmown when the policy as
made, fails to consider the cases where the insurance is on goods not yet
bought or in existence.
IcHoffran v. Is. Co. (1865) 32 N. Y. 405: Lane v. I3. Co. (1835) 12
Ie. 44; Hooper v. Fire Ins. Co. (1858) 17 N. Y. 424. Vance, Inzrarzcc
(1904) 120; 2 Joyce, Insurance (1917) sec. 901; (1009) 52 L. R. A. 340,
note.
7 Western Pipe Lines v. Home INs. Co. (1891) 145 Pa. 34G, 22 Atl. 663.
:18 Mills v. Ins. Co. (1873) 37 Iowa, 400.
19 Sawyer v. Dodge County Mat. Izs. Co. (1875) 37 Wis. 503. An insur-
ance on "fixtures" placed or to be placed in certain buildings covers fixtures
erected in the building subsequent to the issuance of the policy. Ncw York
Gas Light Co. v. Fire Ins. Co. (1829, N. Y.) 2 Hall, 103. A builder's policy
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The same rule obtains with respect to policies of re-insurance.
Such policies, by which a company undertakes to indemnify an-
other company to the extent of its losses on risks it then holds or
may thereafter take during the life of the contract are valid, both
in cases of marine2 0 and fire2' insurance.
It thus appears that policies of insurance have been held valid
though the property may not have been in existence, and part or
all of the risk was to attach in the future. The designation "for
whom it may concern" in such cases includes all persons possess-
ing an insurable interest who are contemplated by the person
taking out the insurance.2 2  The person really interested in the
property insured under such a policy may take the benefit of the
insurance, though the insurance was not authorized, by ratifying
the agent's act even after loss.2 3  The English courts, while ap-
plying this rule to cases of marine insurance,2- have not extended
it to an unauthorized contract of fire insurance. - This distinc-
tion has, however, been repudiated in this country.2
0
In such cases it is obvious that an insurable interest at the time
of the loss is sufficient, and need not, in fact could not exist at
the time the contract was made. But the dictum early an-
nounced,2 7 that an insurable interest must exist at the time the
contract was made, has been thought to prevent contracts of
anticipatory fire insurance. 2  The strong tendency of the courts,
is valid, and the risk will attach in proportion as the construction progresses
and the interest of the insured increases. Commercial Fire Ins. Co. v.
Capitol City Ins. Co. (1886) 81 Ala. 320, 8 So. 222; Ulmer v. Ins. Co.
(1901) 61 S. C. 459, 39 S. E. 712; Sullivan v. Ins. Co. (1892, 2d Dept.) 34
App. Div. 164, 54 N. Y. Supp. 629. A policy upon the expected profits
of a venture undertaken is valid, but there can be no recovery for loss
of profits unless such profits are specifically covered by the policy. See
Vance, too. cit. supra note 16; L. R. A. 1917C, 726.
2 0 Boston Ins. Co. v. Globe Fire Ins. Co. (1899) 174 Mass. 229, 54 N. E.
543.
21 Sun Ins. Ofie v. Merz (1900) 66 N. J. L. 301, 45 Atl. 785.
-- Hagan v. Scottish Union Ins. Co. (1902) 186 U. S. 423, 22 Sup. Ct.
862; Duncan v. China Mut. Ins. Co. (1891) 129 N. Y. 237, 29 N. E. 76.
23Hagan v. Scottish Union Ins. Co. supra note 22; Fire Ins. Asso. of Eny-
land v. Merchants and Miners Trans. Co. (1886) 66 Md. 339, 7 AtI. 905.
Vance, Cases on Insurance (1914) 93, note; 2 Joyce, op. cit. supra note 16,
sec. 619; 3 Joyce, op. cit. sec. 1689.
24 Williams v. North China Ins. Co. (1876) L. R. 1 C. P. D. 757.
25 Grover v. Matthews [1910] 2 K. B. 401.
26 Marqusee v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1912, C. C. A. 2d) 198 Fed. 475;
petition for writ of certiorari denied, (1912) 229 U. S. 621, 33 Sup. Ct. 1049.
27Sadlers' Go. v. Babcock (1743, Ch.) 2 Atk. 554.
2 Howard v. Lancashire Ins. Co. (1885) 11 Can. Sup. Ct. 92, criticized
in May, Insurance (3d ed. 1891) sec. 100 a. A dictum to the same effect
is contained in Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Vogel (1903) 30 Ind. App. 281,
65 N. E. 1056.
COMMENTS
however, seems to be to disregard the dictum, and to hold valid
bona fide anticipatory fire insurance.29
It is believed that there is no legal objection to the making of
a bona fide contract of insurance upon goods not yet in existence,
which shall attach in the future, and that the interested party
contemplated under such a policy would be able to take the benefit.
From this standpoint, it is proper to consider the agreement be-
tween the Palmetto Company and the Chrysler Corporation, as
"the contract of insurance," effected in Michigan. The certificate
issued to the purchaser of a car, upon which some stress was
laid, should not affect the result if we concede that a valid con-
tract of insurance was in effect, especially since the purchaser is
protected even though no such certificate was issued.
The holding of the Maine and Wisconsin courts, that the con-
tract of insurance was not made until the purchase of a car in
those states, necessarily induces the conclusion that Chrysler
dealers are agents selling insurance in those states. For then
the transaction can be treated only as a standing offer made by
the Palmetto Company to unidentified parties, who may accept
by the doing of the act stipulated. Under this construction, the
Palmetto Company creates in the Chrysler Corporation a power
to extend its offer to the purchaser of a Chrysler car, and the ac-
ceptance of the offer in Maine or Wisconsin by the purchase would
be "selling" insurance in those states. The determination of
these courts, that the purchaser of a car is not insured without
his express assent, is in accord with this view. But what induced
the courts to reach this result was their unwillingness to see that
there may be a valid contract of insurance upon goods not yet in
existence, with the risk attaching in the future. It seems that
the parties have attempted to frame a contract which shall be
valid in all respects in Michigan, irrespective of the assent of the
purchaser, and no legal objection can be perceived to their so do-
ing. The contract under this theory should be construed as one
made in Michigan between the Chrysler Corporation and the Palm-
etto Company, for the benefit of a third party not yet identified.
This view of the contract, however, does not necessitate a re-
sult opposite to the one reached by the Maine and Wisconsin
courts. The contract made in Michigan created a future and
conditional right in the Chrysler Corporation that the Palmetto
Company should pay it or its nominee to be specified in the future.
This nominee must pay for his nomination as the party to take
29 Gf. Davis v. New EnglandL Fire IRs. Co. (1892) 70 Vt. 21; Hooper v.
Robinson (1878) 98 U. S. 528; Sun Offlce Fire Ins. Co. v. Merm, supra note
21. Though these cases dealt with recognized exceptions to the interest
rule, the broad language used would seem to cover the case of fire insur-
ance contracts also. See Vance, Insurance (1904) 121.
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under the contract.30  The statement made by the New York.
court, that the transaction amounts to a "gift" of the insurance,
can scarcely be supported. The purchaser is obviously paying
for the insurance, and the price of Chrysler cars was raised as
soon as the plan went into effect. The act of nomination takes
place in the state of the purchaser. The basic question, then, is
one of statutory interpretation, whether the doing of this act con-
stitutes Chrysler dealers agents "effecting" or "procuring" in-
surance within the meaning of the statutes. There is some color
for this view. When a dealer sells a car, the insurance goes with
it, and until such act, by the very terms of the policy, the risk
does not attach. Prior to this act there was no right in the
nominee. The dealer has the power to create such a right in
the purchaser. Assuming that the insurance may run with the
car like the tires or other automobile accessories, a propositiop
denied by the Maine and Wisconsin courts, the dealer might still
be considered, in ordinary parlance, as "effecting" or "procuring"
insurance when he sells the car. On the other hand, it may be
argued that since the dealer is primarily interested in the sale of
a car, and since a valid contract of insurance is already in effect,
and the premiums paid, the acts performed by him should not
be construed as coming within the statutes. Moreover, it is diffi-
cult, under any strict principles of agency, to consider the Chrys-
ler dealer as an agent of the Palmetto Company. He is neither
hired by the company nor paid by it, nor has he any direct au-
thority from it or connection with it, or any discretion as to the
terms of the insurance. Probably it would be more consistent
with the principles of agency, and the rules governing the crea-
tion of bona fide anticipatory contracts of insurance, to hold that
such a plan as is here involved was not within the contemplation-
of the framers of the insurance laws, and further legislative ac-
tion should be awaited before holding it invalid. But even assum-
ing that the language of the statute is ambiguous, the construction
to be placed on it should be determined only on the basis of the
purpose of the insurance laws, and of the merits of the conflicting-
policies involved in the plan.
The most obvious arguments in favor of the view that the
Chrysler plan violates the insurance laws are those based upon
the loss of revenue and the protection of vested interests. The
insurance which formerly the purchaser of a Chrysler car would'
place with a resident or licensed corporation is now removed from
these companies, with a proportionate lessening of their business,
3o The 'nominee might be considered as a third party beneficiary un-
ascertained in the contract. The cases dealing with anticipatory insur-
ance, however, treat the party taking under the designation "for whom it




and a proportionate lessening of the revenues to be collected by
the state from such policies. Although these considerations are
bound to influence the courts, it is believed that they are entitled
to little weight. The purpose of insurance regulation, it would
seem, is not to secure revenue, but control.z' And the interests
of insurance companies, or considerations of revenue, should not
be placed before those of the purchasing public of Chrysler cars.
A more weighty consideration in favor of this view is the fact
that the effect of a contrary holding would be to remove the con-
tract from the jurisdiction of the state of the purchaser. This
would tend to defeat the very purpose of the insurance laws.
For the purchaser in laine or Wisconsin would have to go to
Mlichigan, or to some other state where he could get service of
process on the Palmetto Company, in order to sue on the policy.
Further, the insurance laws of lichigan may not be stringent
enough to meet the standards set in Mlaine or Wisconsin. Thus a
poorly equipped company, which may satisfy the requirements of
the lichigan laws, might nevertheless, according to the stand-
ards of those other states, be deemed an unsafe one to be en-
trusted with the protection of its citizens. Although this argu-
ment presents the greatest technical difficulty in the Chrysler
plan, it is believed that as a practical matter the objections can
have no great weight. The contract is protected by the laws of
Michigan, and the insurance requirements of all states probably
tend to approximate each other. And since the very purpose of
the plan is to sell more automobiles, the choice of a safe insurance
company by the Chrysler corporation is practically assured.
Against this view, and in favor of the plan, are the manifold
advantages of securing a uniform and moderate charge on time
payment sales of automobiles, by eliminating the middleman, and
dealing directly with the purchaser through the wholesaler. As
an economic device, the Chrysler plan is eminently sound, and it
is believed that legally it is unobjectionable, and that the balance
of convenience and sound policy is in favor of it.
CONTRACTS EXEMPTING CARRIERS FROM RESPONSIBILITY FOR N7EG-
LIGENCE AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
The question of the validity of stipulations exempting carriers
from responsibility for negligence in contracts for interstate car-
riage was long a source of much confusion in the state courts
owing to the conflicting state laws on this subject.' This unsatis-
factory condition was eliminated by federal legislation, the Car-
s' Cf. Jalonid. v. Green County Oil Co. (1910, Ga.) 60 S. E. 810; mat.
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg (1922) 260 U. S. 71, 43 Sup. Ct. 32.
'Hutchinson, Carriers (3d ed. 1906) secs. 199-224.
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mack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, making such
stipulations void.2
Similarly, the Harter Act has rendered much more certain the
law in this respect with regard to carriage by sea.3 This act
applies to bpth American and foreign vessels operating to and
from the ports of the United States as to carriage of goods,4 but
it has no application to the carriage of passengers or their per-
sonal baggageA That perplexing problems in the Conflict of
Laws may still arise, outside the scope of this legislation, is shown
by two recent cases, one in this country and one in England.
In Oceanic, Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran (1925, C. C. A. 2d)
9 Fed. (2d) 724, the plaintiff, a resident of Indiana, through her
agent, a tourist company in Boston, purchased in Massachusetts
from the agent of defendant, an English steamship company, a
ticket booking her through to Paris and entitling her to passage
from Montreal to Liverpool on defendant's ship of English regis-
try. Plaintiff brought suit in a New York court for personal inju-
ries received during the voyage between Canada and England due
to the negligence of defendant's employee. The case was removed
to the Federal District Court, where the defense offered was a
clause in the contract for passage exempting the defendant from
responsibility for negligence. Such exemption was valid under
English law and the contract expressly stipulated that all questions
arising under this clause should be decided according to English
law with reference to which the contract was made. The District
Court gave judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant appealed.
The Circuit Court held (one judge dissenting), that a clause in the
contract of a common carrier exempting the carrier from responsi-
bility for negligence, when made in the United States, is illegal
2 Act of March 4, 1915 (38 Stat. at L. 1196, 1197).
3 Act of Feb. 13, 1893 (27 Stat. at L. 445).
"The [Hatter] act is a compromise between the interests of shipper and
carrier, and was intended, in the interests of American shipping, to put
the American carrier on an equality with the foreign carrier.
"The first section forbade any stipulation against negligence in connec-
tion generally with the handling of the cargo.
"The second section allowed the carrier to reduce his former absolute
warranty of seaworthiness to the measure of due diligence, provided he
so stipulated, but did not do this proprio vigore for him.
"It allowed a similar stipulation as to the handling of the cargo.
"The third section of its own force exempted the carrier from liability
for faults in navigation, sea perils, acts of God or public enemies, inherent
vice in thing carried, insufficiency of package, legal process, and deviation,
provided the carrier showed due diligence as to seaworthiness in case he
wished to set up any of these defenses."
Hughes, Handbook of Admiralty Law (2d ed. 1920) 194.
4 The Silvia (1898) 171 U. S. 462, 19 Sup. Ct. 7.
5The Rosedale (1898, S. D. N. Y.) 88 Fed. 324; La Bourgogne (1906, C. C.




and void and unenforceable in the courts of the United States,
notwithstanding the expressed intention of the parties that Eng-
lish law should govern.
In the English case, Jones v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co.
[1924] 2 K. B. 730, an Englishman purchased in Detroit, from
the same defendant, a ticket with identical stipulations for passage
from New York to his home in England and was injured enroute
due to the negligence of defendant's employees. The English
Court held for the defendant, giving effect to the expressed inten-
tion of the parties as to their choice of law.
If either of these cases had come before one of our state courts,
since neither is within the scope of federal legislation, the state
court would have been free to apply one of the following recog-
nized theories of the Conflict of Laws as to the validity of a con-
tract, and the result would depend on the theory used:-
(1) The "territorial theory," under which the state where the
contract is technically made has the exclusive power to create the
contract.G In these cases, under this theory, the court must look
to American law and the stipulation would be held void. As a
fixed rule this has been found unsuited to meet the purposes of
the Conflict of Laws7 and has been departed from both by the
English courts and by a majority of American jurisdictions."
(2) The "intention theory," whereby the court looks to the
presumed intention of the parties as to their choice of law, as de-
termined by the circumstances of each case.0 Here the parties
G McDaniel v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. (186S) 24 Iowa, 412; Fon-cca v.
Cunard S. S. Co. (1891) 153 Mass. 553, 27 N. E. 665.
7For a criticism of this rule in its practical application see Lorenzen,
Validity and Effect of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws (1921) 30 YAL
LAw JOURNAL, 655, 658 et seq.
That there is no logical necessity for such a rule, except for thoze who
persist in reifying rights and other legal relations and who start vith the
fixed premise, based on territorial assumptions as to jurisdiction, that the
forum in applying the principles of the Conflict of Laws is enforcing an
obligatio created elsewhere, see Cook, The Logical and Legal Basc of the
Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YAL L,,w JOURNAL, 457.
8For a summary of the English and American cases, see Beale, What
Law Governs the Validity of a Contract (1909) 23, HARv. L. REv. 79 (with
an appendLx of federal cases at 100).
9 In re Mlssouri S. S. Co. (1889) L. R. 42 Ch. D. 321.
In most cases the acts of the parties and the surrounding circumstances
are such that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine what
law governs, and so the court must resort to a legal fiction for its guidance.
Most courts raise a prima facie presumption that the parties intended to
accept the law of the place of making. Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v.
Phenix Ins. Co. (1889) 129 U. S. 397, 9 Sup. Ct 469. This is admitteily
a mere fiction as to the intention of the parties, and with the "territorial"
or "obligatia" theory of the Conflict of Laws exploded, it satisfies no logical
necessity. On the other hand, a presumption that the parties intended to
make a valid agreement rests on a solid foundation of fact. It is sub-
mitted, therefore, that the courts which follow the "intention theory" should
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having expressed their intention that English law, the law of the
place of performance, shall control, the stipulation would be held
valid. 10 Although courts favor a flexible rule of this sort, it seems
theoretically indefensible to allow the parties by choosing their
own law to determine the validity of their own acts. 1
(3) The law of the place of performance.2 Under this theory
English law would govern and the stipulation would be upheld.
Originally this was merely an application of the "intention the-
ory," the courts presuming that in the absence of evidence of a
contrary intention, the parties contracted with a view to the law
of the place of performance, 3 but in a few states this has devel-
oped into a positive rule of law. This rule seems particularly
inapplicable to a contract of carriage, which is frequently to be
performed in a number of jurisdictions. To olviate this diffi-
culty the law of the place of delivery (place of final performance)
has arbitrarily been held to govern.14
(4) The law of the place of breach.' In these two cases,
under this theory, the law of the flag1 would govern and the
stipulation would be upheld under English law. This is in reality
an application of the delictual rather than the contractual theory
to the relation of the carrier, for the generally accepted view is
that contracts of carriage are indivisible.1 As applied to the
carriage of passengers, as distinguished from the carriage of
goods and baggage, this theory has some support from both writ-
work with a prima facie presumption that the parties contracted with refer-
ence to the law that will sustain the contract. Cf. Pritchard v. Norton
(1882) 106 U. S. 124, 1 Sup. Ct. 102.
10 An express stipulation by the parties that the validity of the contract
should be governed by a certain law would seem conclusive evidence of their
intention, yet the United States Supreme Court has never expressly decided
this point. Cf. Compania do Navigacion Ia Flechat v. Brauer (1897) 168
U. S. 104, 18 Sup. Ct. 12 (where the court avoided the issue). Certainly
not when the acts of the parties are mala fide. Andrews v. Pond (1839, U,
S.) 13 Pet. 65. Or against public policy. The Kensington, supra note 5.
11 For a criticism of the "intention theory," see Beale, op. cit. supra note
8, at 260; Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note 7, at 655.
12Brown v. Camden etc. Ry. (1877) 83 Pa. 316.
13 Story, Conflict of Laws (8th ed. 1883) 376.
14 Railroad Co. v. Sheppard (1897) 56 Ohio St. 68, 46 N. E. 61. The law
of the place of shipment has also been held to govern. Western R. R. Co.
v. Exposition Cotton Mills (1888) 81 Ga. 522, 7 S. E. 916.
" Hughes v. Pennsylvania By. Co. (1902) 202 Pa. 222, 51 Atl. 990; Rail-
road Co. v. Druien (1904) 118 Ky. 237, 80 S. W. 778; Barter v. Wheeler
(1869) 49 N. H. 9; The Trinacria (1890, S. D. N. Y.) 42 Fed. 863; Bactier
v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (1894, S. D. N. Y. ) 59 Fed. 789.
16 The law of the flag is also a circumstance of weight in arriving at the
governing law under the "intention theory." Lloyd v. Guibert (1865) L. R.
1 Q. B. 115.
'7 Hutchinson, op. cit. supra note 1, sec. 210; see Fish v. Delaware L, & W.
By. (1914) 211 N. Y. 374, 105 N. E. 661.
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ers 1 and courts,19 for the obligation of a carrier to a passenger is
fundamentally one of tort law.20
(5) That law which will sustain the validity of the contract,
provided that it has a substantial connection therewith.2 ' Apply-
ing this principle, the stipulation could be upheld under English
law. This theory perhaps best meets the requirements of both
the courts and the parties where a choice of law is involved.2 2
The instant American case, however, came up in a federal
court, where the problem is further complicated by the fact that
the enforcement of such contracts is said to be opposed to the
public policy of the forum.2 3  The federal courts have been par-
ticularly hostile to the enforcement of stipulations by a carrier
against responsibility for negligence,24 and even before federal
3. See 1 Hutchinson, op. cit. supra note 1, sec. 205 (to the effect that the
relation of the carrier to the passenger depends primarily on the law of
negligence, and that the same law should govern both the cause of action
and the defense thereto.)
1 Smith v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. (1912, C. C. A. 8th) 194 Fed. 79;
Burnett v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co. (1896) 176 Pa. 45, 34 At. 972; Linds aly .
Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co. (1915, C. C. A. 7th) 226 Fed. 23 (stipulation
against responsibility for negligence in a contract of employment) ; contra:
Dyke v. Erie Ry. (1877) 45 N. Y. 113; cf. Mcrritt Creamery Co. v. Santa
Fe Ry. (190S) 128 Mo. App. 420, 107 S. W. 462 (where the choice of law
was made to depend upon the form of action-obviously unsound.)
20 2 Williston, Contracts (1920) sec. 1113.
21 Talbott v. Merchants' Despatch (1875) 41 Iowa, 247; Smith v. Atchison
T. & S. F. Ry. (1913) 38 Okla. 157, 132 Pac. 494; Millcr v. Tiffany (1864,
U. S.) 1 Wall, 298 (usury case); cf. Pritchard v. Norton, s:pra note 9.2 2 Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note 7, at 673. This theory offers an explan-
ation of the apparent conflict between Scuddcr v. Union Nat. Baidk (1875)
91 U. S. 406, and Hall v. Cordel (1891) 142 U. S. 116, 12 Sup. Ct. 154.
23 In The Kensington, supra note 5, the Supreme Court says that "the
exdstence of the rule of public policy not the ultimate causes upon which
it may depend is the criterion" and intimates that these stipulations are not
enforceable in the forum under any circumstances. For a more liberal
interpretation of The Kensbgton, see Railroad Co. -e. Druic, aupra note 15.
A few state courts refuse to enforce such provisions, although the con-
tract was made and to be performed elsewhere. Fox v. PostaZ Telegrap.
Co. (1909) 138 Wis. 648, 120 N. W. 399; Chicago B. & Q. Ry. -e. Gardincr
(1897) 51 Neb. 70, 70 N. W. 508 (where state constitution prohibited such
stipulations); contra: Railroad Co. v. Druien, supra note 15 (enforced,
notwithstanding constitutional provision to the contrary) ; O'Rcgan v. Cn-
nerd S. S. Co. (1894) 160 Mass. 356, 35 N. E. 1070 (holding such stipula-
tions neither illegal nor immoral, notwithstanding that they would be void
as against public policy if made in Massachusetts); Forepaugh, v. Railroad
Co. (1889) 128 Pa. 217, 18 Atl. 503 (criticising the attitude of the federal
courts).
24 The federal courts refuse to enforce these pro,.isions although the
parties expressly stipulate that foreign law shall govern. The Kenington,
supra note 5 (baggage); The New England (1901, D. Mass.) 110 Fed.
415 (baggage); Lewisohn v. National S. S. Co. (1893, E. D. N. Y.)
56 Fed. 602 (cargo, prior to Harter Act); The Iowa (1892, D. M5ass.) 50 Fed.
561 (cargo, prior to Harter Act); The Glenmaris (1893, E. D. Pa.) 69 Fed.
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legislation on this subject, treated the matter as one of general
commercial law and refused to be bound by the law of the several
states.25
The Supreme Court has assigned two reasons why contracts
exempting carriers from liability for negligence are contrary to
our public policy-(1) because they are unjust and unreasonable
and wanting in the requirement of voluntary assent; in other
words, because they contain an element of coercion or oppression
'which renders the making of these contracts prejudicial to the
public interest; (2) because they tend to increase negligence and
to cheapen human life.2 C In a number of lower federal court
decisions, however, effect has been given to a stipulation of this
sort where it related to transportation of property on a foreign
vessel on a voyage which did not include a port of the United
States and where the contract was made outside the United
States..2 7 It is submitted that these decisions are sound and that,
where the contract is neither made nor to be performed within
the jurisdiction of the United States, its enforcement in our courts
violates no public policy of this country.
So in the instant American case it seems to the writer that no
sound American public policy demands that our courts should con-
trol the operation of English common carriers between Canada
and England.28  The English law is presumably better equipped
to deal with English conditions and to do justice between the
parties. It is submitted that what the court in this case really
decided, regardless of the formula assigned as the basis of their
decision, was that the making of such a contract in the United
States violated our public policyYD The court does not talk this
472 (where the court intimates such a stipulation will not be enforced irre-
spective of the place of contract) ; Botany Worsted Mills v. Knott (1897, C.
C. A. 2d) 82 Fed. 471, affirmed in 179 U. S. 69, 21 Sup. Ct. 30 (cargo, where
the stipulation was rendered void by the Harter Act) ; contra: The Oran-
more (1885, Md.) 24 Fed. 922, affirmed, (1885, C. C. Md.) 92 Fed. 396 (this
case is no longer followed).
25 New York Central R. R. Co. v. Lockwood (1873, U. S.) 17 Wall. 357
(drover travelling on a freight train with a shipment of cattle); contra:
Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Kavanaugh (1899, C. C. A. 5th) 92 Fed. 56;
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Kenpton (1905, C. C. A. 9th) 138 Fed. 992 (where
there was a state statute on the subject).
26 New York Central R. R. Co. v. Lockwood, supra note 25.
27 The Miguel di Larrinaga (1914, S. D. N. Y.) 217 Fed. 678; see The
Fri (1907, C. C. A. 2d) 154 Fed. 333. Such stipulations were also en-
forced in a federal forum in The Trinacria and Bactier v. La Compagnic
Generale Transatlantique, supra note 15.
28 Cf. Railroad Co. v. Druien, supra note 15 (where the court says that
the public policy of a state is confined to the regulation of its own affairs
and transactions occurring within its sovereignty).
29 Of. The Glenmavis, supra note 24 (where the court expressed the view
that these stipulations affect injuriously not only the immediate parties but
the public at large).
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language, however, but falls back on a mechanical use of the lex
loci contractws rule, after attempting to support its decision by
citing two United States Supreme Court cases,o neither of which
is in accord as to theory with the instant case or conclusive on the
facts.
The English case, on the other hand, follows the "intention
theory," which seems to be the settled law in England. The court
assumes that such a contract made in the United States between
an English subject, resident in England, and an English carrier
for transportation on an English ship would violate no law of the
United States. If our policy is to protect the public against
entering into such contracts, undoubtedly our courts would e-tend
the same protection to an alien within our borders. But in the
absence of a statute or an authoritative determination of an Amer-
ican court upon this precise point, there seems no reason why an
English court should hold the contract contrary to American pub-
lic policy.
IS THE FEDERAL GIFT TAX A DIRECT TAX?'
The perplexing question of what constitutes a direct tax within
the meaning of the Constitution has been raised once more by the
recent federal gift tax- which imposed on all transfers by gift a
tax identical in rates with those of the accompanying inheritance
tax3 -no tax below $50,000, 1 per cent on $50,000 graduating to
40 per cent on $10,000,000. In the recent case of McNdr v. An-
derso11,4 an action by a tax-payer to recover a tax assessed under
this statute and paid under protest, District Judge Augustus
N. Hand declared the tax "direct," hence unconstitutional
because not apportioned5 He based his decision squarely on the
authority of Pollock v. Farmners' Loan & Trust Co.9 It must
be admitted that if the Supreme Court religiously follows that
case, a gift tax is necessarily a direct tax. But, for a number of
reasons this does not seem probable.
Seven times in the period from 1796 to 1894, the Supreme Court
was confronted with the contention that an unapportioned tax
30Liverpool & G. TV. Steamn Co. v. Phenix IN3. Co., supra note 9; The
Kensington, supra note 5.
1 Subsequent to the completion of this comment, the case of Blodgctt v,.
Holden (1926, W. D. Mich.) 11 Fed. (2d) 180, was handed down, upholding
the constitutionality of the gift tax much along the lines suggested herein.
-Act of June 2, 1924 (43 Stat, at L. 253, 313).
3 Supra note 2, at 303.
4 (1926, S. D. N. Y.) 10 Fed. (2d) 813.
z U. S. Const., Art. 1, sec. 2, ch. 3; Art. 1, sec. 9, el. 4.
6 (1894) 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673; 158 U. S. 601, 15 Sup. CL 912.
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was "direct" and the contention was on each occasion rejected.,
In so doing the court consistently relied upon Alexander Hamil-
ton's definition,8 ,which restricted "direct" taxes to poll taxes and
taxes on land. This pragmatic definition, admittedly unsound
economically, seemed the only practical solution of the difficulty.
For as the Hylton case pointed out, the reason for the existence
of the clause in the Constitution was that the southern represen-
tatives to the Constitutional Convention, fearful lest their large
slave population should be taxed at the same rate as the free pop-
ulation of the North, and that their vast, undeveloped acreage be
taxe4 at the same rate as the scant developed acreage of the
North, insisted on some provision in the Constitution which would
prevent the imposition of such unequal burdens. The clause pro-
viding for the apportionment of "direct" taxes was the ultimate
concession to this demand and the record of the debates shows
that the delegates had an extremely vague notion as to what was
meant by "direct." 10 Since any other definition would have seri-
ously crippled the taxing power of Congress, and since it seemed
logical that in ordering an apportionment of "direct" taxes, the
Convention must have had in mind such taxes as could be appor-
tioned," Hamilton's definition was accepted unhesitatingly by the
courts, and also by the leading jurists of the period.12
The Pollock13 case, a five to four decision, upset this sensible
solution of the problem and embraced the economic definition of a
"direct" tax-a tax on property because of its ownership. But
in so doing the court further weakened the force of its decision
by attempting to distinguish, not overrule, all of the seven prior
cases. The result is that all but the Springer 4 case have since
been cited with approval by the Supreme Court in a number of
.7Hylton v. United States (1796, U. S.) 3 Dall. 171 (a tax on carriages) .
License Tax Cases (1866) 72 U. S. 462 (a tax on the sale of liquor and lot-
tery tickets); Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule (1868) 74 U. S. 433 (a tax on
the gross income of insurance companies); Veazie Bank v. Fenno (1869)
75 U. S. 533 (a 10 per cent tax on bank notes issued by state banks) ; Col-
lector v. Hubbard (1870) 79 U. S. 1 (income tax); Scholey v. Rew (1874)
90 U. S. 331 (a succession tax on real estate) ; Springer v. United States
(1880) 102 U. S. 586 (income tax).
8 7 Hamilton's Works 845.
9 Supra. note 7, at 177, (Paterson, J. and Wilson, J. who sat on this case
were both prominent members of the convention, and were heartily in
accord with Hamilton's definition).
20 Riddle, The Supreme Court's Theory of a Direct Tax (1917) 15 Mic.
L. REV. 566, note 5.
I Supra note 7, at 181.
12 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed. 1903) 680; 1 Kent. Commen-
taries (13th ed. 1884) 282; 1 Story, The Constitution (5th ed. 1891) sec.
954 et seq.
13 Supra note 6.
14 Supra note 7.
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cases involving the same problem,s and only one case'5 since 1894
has given comfort to the followers of the Pollock case, and there
the decision depended solely upon the construction of the word
"property" in a clause of the Kentucky Constitution which for-
bids "property" taxes unless uniform in operation. The numer-
ous other cases involving the "direct" tax problem'- although
avoiding the issue of the Pollock case by declaring the taxes in-
volved to be not on property but on the privilege of using prop-
erty, or of doing business, have so whittled it down as to make it
seem probably that the Supreme Court will soon be able virtu-
ally to ignore its authority."s
In the instant case, Judge Hand attempted to distinguish these
decisions on the ground that the taxes involved were treated as
excises for historical reasons, pointing out that the classification
of subjects of taxation is largely historical, not scientific. Such
an argument is in effect an acknowledgment of the soundness of
Hamilton's definition, and a confession that the logical applica-
tion of the economic definition of a "direct" tax would under our
constitution virtually prevent the introduction of new taxes, so
vitally necessary to the successful conduct of the complex, ex-
tensive governmental structure of today.
Recognizing this fact, yet unwilling to overrule the Pollock case,
the Supreme Court has been forced to the afore-mentioned eva-
sions in order to permit Congress to introduce new theories of
taxation to meet the rapidly changing economic conditions. The
extent of these evasions is apparent when it is considered that the
court has been willing to hold that the following are not taxes on
property but are taxes on the privilege of doing or of using: inher-
itance taxes ;9 sales taxes evidenced by stamps on all sales of
stocks, bonds and merchandise on any exchange or board of
Z5Nicol v. Ames (1898) 173 U. S. 509, 19 Sup. CL 522; Knowlton v. Moore
(1899) 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747; Patton -e. Brady (1901) 184 U. S. COS,
22 Sup. Ct. 493; Thoras v. United States (1903) 192 U. S. 3G3, 24 Sup. Ct.
305; Spreckels Svgar Refining Co. v. McClain (1903) 192 U. S. 097, 24 Sup.
Ct. 376; Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co. (1910) 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342;
Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (1915) 240 U. S. 1, 3G Sup. Ct. 26.
26 Dawson v. Kentlzwky Distilleres Co. (1920) 255 U. S. 288, 41 Sup. Ct.
272. (A Kentucky statute sought to impose a tax of 50 cents a gallon upon
whiskey withdrawn from bond within the state, or transferred in bond from
the state elsewhere. The tax was clearly not a tax on the business of ware-
housing, for the whiskey could go through any number of bonded ware-
houses within the state without being taxed. Nor was it a tax on the privi-
lege of storing, for the whiskey could be stored indefinitely without being
taxed).
:1 I71ra, notes 19-24.
"I Riddle, op. cit. supra note 10, at 577.
'-9 Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Savizgs Bankd (1893) 170 U. S. 2813, 13
Sup. Ct. 594; Knowlton v. Moore, supra note 15.
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trade ;20 an additional tax on tobacco after the original tax had
been paid and the tobacco stamped ;21 a tax on the gross annual
receipts of a corporation in excess of $250,000 ;22 a tax on the net
income over $5,000 of all corporations ;2-- a tonnage tax on foreign-
built yachts owned by United States citizens. The analogy of
some of these cases to the instant one is almost perfect. For the
only distinction between a gift and a devise is that the latter is a
statutory, not a common law privilege, and surely no such techni-
cal argument should prevail to overthrow so important a tax.
But even if this were a valid distinction, it seems obvious that the'
privilege of purchase and sale is based no less on custom and com-
mon law than the privilege of giving,2 yet it is subject to taxa-
tion on the ground that such a privilege is the creation of law and
dependent upon government for its existence. 2  And if it is
argued that a tax on sales is one which can be shifted, while that
on a gift cannot, that is begging the question. For such an argu-
ment assumes that the tax is one on property, whereas it is merely
a tax on a privilege connected with the property. That this dis-
tinction is recognized by the Supreme Court as a valid one neces-
sarily follows from the decisions upholding inheritance taxes,
taxes on corporate income, and taxes on private yachts, for ob-
viously none of these can be shifted.
This line of decisions coupled with the fact that the gift tax is
necessary in order to prevent the annual loss of millions of dollars
to the government in income tax and inheritance tax payments
now so easily avoided,' 7 seems to make it an almost inevitable con-
clusion that the Supreme Court will hold that a gift tax is not a
"direct" tax, but is a tax on the privilege of giving. For as.said
by Mr. Justice Peckham in the course of his opinion upholding a
stamp tax on the sale of merchandise,2s "As a mere abstract, scien-
tific or economic problem, a particular tax might possibly be
regarded as a direct tax, when as a practical matter pertaining to
the actual operation of the tax it might quite plainly appear to be
indirect."
2o Nicol v. Ames, supra, note 15; Thomas v. United States, supra note 15.
21 Patton v. Brady, supra note 15.
2 2 Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, supra note 15.
23 Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., supra note 15.
24 Billings v. United States (1913) 232 U. S. 261, 34 Sup. Ct. 421.
2$ Gleason & Otis, Inheritance Taxation (4th ed. 1925) 182.
2 0 Nicol v. Ames, supra note 15', at 518.
27 As the Congressional debates prior to enactment of this tax so clearly
pointed out (1924) 65 Cong. Rec. 8353.
28 Nicol v. Ames, supra note 15, at 516.
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